The Impact of the War in the Middle East on Mozambique and the Region
Executive Summary The conflict between Iran, the United States of America (USA) and Israel, triggered by the US attack on 28 February 2026, has led to a geopolitical stalemate of uncertain duration. Negotiations have stalled, mutual mistrust persists, and the markets are already reflecting this outlook: Brent was trading above USD 100 per barrel at the time of writing. For Mozambique — a net importer of fuel and fertilisers, importing 100 per cent of its petrol, diesel and jet fuel, of which around 80 per cent comes from the Gulf region — the shock is simultaneously economic, fiscal and social. The speakers agreed on three key messages. Firstly: the conflict is not a one-off event; it is a symptom of a transition from the liberal international order to a more realist system, characterised by hard power, in which the United Nations (UN) Security Council finds it increasingly difficult to regulate and international law is constantly disregarded. Second: the impact on Mozambique is manifesting itself through four channels — fuel prices, fertilisers and food security, maritime logistics costs, and fiscal/exchange rate pressure — exacerbated by the queues and disorder experienced since mid-April, even in the absence of any actual stock shortages. Thirdly: there is a window of opportunity — regional refining, Mozambican natural gas, new African port routes and diversified economic diplomacy — which will only materialise if the country acts proactively and consistently.
Background: On 28 February 2026, the United States attacked Iranian facilities, in a cycle that began in 2018 with the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal — agreed under President Obama’s administration — and was exacerbated by attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in mid-2025. The US blocked access to the Strait of Hormuz and Iran responded by closing the strait to commercial shipping and attacking US bases in Gulf states (Qatar, the UAE, Iraq and Saudi Arabia), seeking to strike a blow to the US on the economic front, given the military imbalance. The speakers analysed the attack from three perspectives – the individual, the regional and the systemic. At the individual level, the personality of the US President was highlighted; he was described as a ‘game-changer’ and unpredictable, having influenced the decision-making process, particularly regarding US foreign policy. For example, the decision to attack Iran was taken within a very restricted circle in the White House, with opposition from the Vice-President, and without a formal declaration of war to Congress. At the regional level, attention was drawn to Israel’s influence and pressure in favour of an attack on Iran. Iran’s significant military might and its ability to influence regional military groups—Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and others—are factors that make Israel uneasy. It was noted that several previous US presidents — including Obama — had rejected calls for an attack on Iran, making the 2026 decision a historic break with the past. At a systemic level, the global power struggle between China and the US was highlighted. China’s dominance in the energy sector, due to its control over Venezuelan and Iranian oil, posed a challenge to the West. Regarding the immediate consequences of the conflict, the US’s partial isolation was highlighted. Before the attack, Washington did not consult NATO; when the Strait of Hormuz became an obstacle, the US sought support from Germany, the UK and Spain, and they refused, making an explicit cost-benefit analysis: the European economy depends on oil from the Middle East; entering the war would mean jeopardising access to the resource they need for their own military response. The lack of authorisation from the Security Council and internal divisions within NATO (disagreements over Ukraine, with some member states having close ties to Russia) reinforced the bloc’s inaction.
Key Points Raised by the Speakers
Block II — Economic and Logistical Impacts Global energy shock. The Gulf region accounts for around 20 per cent of the world’s oil and 20–25 per cent of its natural gas. At the time of the dialogue, Brent crude had risen to the USD 110 range, a sign that the markets do not foresee a short-term solution.Iran’s strategy of indirect pressure. With no known capability to attack US territory, Iran has directed attacks at US bases in Qatar, the UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as at financial and technological hubs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi — opening up an economic and cyber front to put pressure on the US and its regional allies.Mozambique’s direct exposure. Around 80 per cent of the fuel consumed in the country comes from the Gulf region. Mozambique is identified in a United Nations report as one of the countries most dependent on fertilisers from the Middle East — importing around 22 per cent of its fertilisers, with direct consequences of the conflict on the upcoming agricultural season and food prices.Domestic knock-on effect. Queues at petrol stations, fuel shortages in several neighbourhoods, and the government’s efforts to keep fuel prices in check. Rising fuel prices are spilling over into food, water, electricity and essential goods, which explains the authorities’ caution when adjusting fuel prices. However, the authorities have already announced price adjustments for May.Macro-fiscal pressure. According to the UN, the cost of international credit has risen for developing countries. The shock is weighing on external debt, foreign exchange reserves and fiscal space.Emerging opportunities. Aliko Dangote’s refinery in Nigeria has established itself as a lifeline for the African market and even for the European market; a new refinery is being planned in Tanzania, with participation from Dangote, Uganda and Kenya. African ports — Lamu and Mombasa in Kenya — have seen the number of ships handling cargo rise from 2 to 74 per quarter, a sign of capital flowing into the economies of the East African coast.
Block III — Geopolitics and Mozambique’s Positioning
Accelerated multipolar realignment. China is consolidating its position as an alternative hub, absorbing Iranian and Venezuelan oil and opening its market to African products in the face of AGOA’s difficulties. Russia is gaining ground as an exporter of fertilisers and foodstuffs. Several European leaders have recently visited Beijing — a sign of European hedging in the face of losing priority with the US (‘Make America Great Again’: America first, then China; Europe in third place, according to French President Macron).US strategic pattern. A line of continuity has been drawn — Libya (Gaddafi), Syria (Assad) and now Iran, as strongholds to be toppled before the focus shifts to the Far East and Russia.The stance of Mozambique and Africa. The consensus amongst the speakers was one of pragmatic non-alignment: the African Union is calling for de-escalation and a peaceful solution; South Africa has offered to act as a mediator; Mozambique must maintain open relations with all sides, defend multilateralism and protect its economic interests. This mirrors the approach already adopted in response to the Russia–Ukraine war.Mozambican Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a strategic lever. In a European and Asian market seeking alternative suppliers, Mozambican natural gas gains strategic value — provided that security in Cabo Delgado and the timetables for Coral Norte, Rovuma LNG and Mozambique LNG are consolidated.
Policy Recommendations
Short term (0–6 months)
Medium term (6–24 months)
Methodological note
Fórum Externo prepared this document. It includes summaries of the speakers’ presentations — Riyadh Sidat (Fórum Externo), Fatima Papelo, lecturer at Joaquim Chissano University, and Irchard Mahomed.
FÓRUM EXTERNO
www.forumexterno.org
geral@forumexterno.org
Background: On 28 February 2026, the United States attacked Iranian facilities, in a cycle that began in 2018 with the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal — agreed under President Obama’s administration — and was exacerbated by attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in mid-2025. The US blocked access to the Strait of Hormuz and Iran responded by closing the strait to commercial shipping and attacking US bases in Gulf states (Qatar, the UAE, Iraq and Saudi Arabia), seeking to strike a blow to the US on the economic front, given the military imbalance. The speakers analysed the attack from three perspectives – the individual, the regional and the systemic. At the individual level, the personality of the US President was highlighted; he was described as a ‘game-changer’ and unpredictable, having influenced the decision-making process, particularly regarding US foreign policy. For example, the decision to attack Iran was taken within a very restricted circle in the White House, with opposition from the Vice-President, and without a formal declaration of war to Congress. At the regional level, attention was drawn to Israel’s influence and pressure in favour of an attack on Iran. Iran’s significant military might and its ability to influence regional military groups—Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and others—are factors that make Israel uneasy. It was noted that several previous US presidents — including Obama — had rejected calls for an attack on Iran, making the 2026 decision a historic break with the past. At a systemic level, the global power struggle between China and the US was highlighted. China’s dominance in the energy sector, due to its control over Venezuelan and Iranian oil, posed a challenge to the West. Regarding the immediate consequences of the conflict, the US’s partial isolation was highlighted. Before the attack, Washington did not consult NATO; when the Strait of Hormuz became an obstacle, the US sought support from Germany, the UK and Spain, and they refused, making an explicit cost-benefit analysis: the European economy depends on oil from the Middle East; entering the war would mean jeopardising access to the resource they need for their own military response. The lack of authorisation from the Security Council and internal divisions within NATO (disagreements over Ukraine, with some member states having close ties to Russia) reinforced the bloc’s inaction.
Key Points Raised by the Speakers
Block II — Economic and Logistical Impacts Global energy shock. The Gulf region accounts for around 20 per cent of the world’s oil and 20–25 per cent of its natural gas. At the time of the dialogue, Brent crude had risen to the USD 110 range, a sign that the markets do not foresee a short-term solution.Iran’s strategy of indirect pressure. With no known capability to attack US territory, Iran has directed attacks at US bases in Qatar, the UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as at financial and technological hubs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi — opening up an economic and cyber front to put pressure on the US and its regional allies.Mozambique’s direct exposure. Around 80 per cent of the fuel consumed in the country comes from the Gulf region. Mozambique is identified in a United Nations report as one of the countries most dependent on fertilisers from the Middle East — importing around 22 per cent of its fertilisers, with direct consequences of the conflict on the upcoming agricultural season and food prices.Domestic knock-on effect. Queues at petrol stations, fuel shortages in several neighbourhoods, and the government’s efforts to keep fuel prices in check. Rising fuel prices are spilling over into food, water, electricity and essential goods, which explains the authorities’ caution when adjusting fuel prices. However, the authorities have already announced price adjustments for May.Macro-fiscal pressure. According to the UN, the cost of international credit has risen for developing countries. The shock is weighing on external debt, foreign exchange reserves and fiscal space.Emerging opportunities. Aliko Dangote’s refinery in Nigeria has established itself as a lifeline for the African market and even for the European market; a new refinery is being planned in Tanzania, with participation from Dangote, Uganda and Kenya. African ports — Lamu and Mombasa in Kenya — have seen the number of ships handling cargo rise from 2 to 74 per quarter, a sign of capital flowing into the economies of the East African coast.
Block III — Geopolitics and Mozambique’s Positioning
Accelerated multipolar realignment. China is consolidating its position as an alternative hub, absorbing Iranian and Venezuelan oil and opening its market to African products in the face of AGOA’s difficulties. Russia is gaining ground as an exporter of fertilisers and foodstuffs. Several European leaders have recently visited Beijing — a sign of European hedging in the face of losing priority with the US (‘Make America Great Again’: America first, then China; Europe in third place, according to French President Macron).US strategic pattern. A line of continuity has been drawn — Libya (Gaddafi), Syria (Assad) and now Iran, as strongholds to be toppled before the focus shifts to the Far East and Russia.The stance of Mozambique and Africa. The consensus amongst the speakers was one of pragmatic non-alignment: the African Union is calling for de-escalation and a peaceful solution; South Africa has offered to act as a mediator; Mozambique must maintain open relations with all sides, defend multilateralism and protect its economic interests. This mirrors the approach already adopted in response to the Russia–Ukraine war.Mozambican Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a strategic lever. In a European and Asian market seeking alternative suppliers, Mozambican natural gas gains strategic value — provided that security in Cabo Delgado and the timetables for Coral Norte, Rovuma LNG and Mozambique LNG are consolidated.
Policy Recommendations
Short term (0–6 months)
- Establish an inter-ministerial task force to monitor the external shock (Finance, Economy, Agriculture, Mineral Resources and Energy, and Foreign Affairs), with regular reports on prices, stocks and shipping routes.
- Boost the strategic reserve of fuel — currently equivalent to around two weeks’ supply, which speakers have identified as clearly insufficient — and of fertilisers for the 2026/2027 agricultural season, in coordination with the private sector.
- Review the mechanism for setting fuel prices to cushion the impact of the shock, balancing subsidies, taxation and fiscal sustainability — without encouraging excessive consumption.
Medium term (6–24 months)
- Diversify fuel and fertiliser suppliers — including within SADC (Dangote/Nigeria, the future refinery in Tanzania) — reducing the concentration of 80 per cent of supply in a single region.
- Deepen intra-African trade: today it accounts for only around 6 per cent of the continent’s external trade. Focus on nearshoring with SADC neighbours and strategic regional partners.
- Invest in modern economic infrastructure — rail, port and air — capable of linking Rovuma to Maputo and integrating the Southern, Central and Northern corridors with neighbouring countries, a prerequisite for lowering prices and creating jobs for young people.
- Accelerate the diversification of the national energy mix, making the most of Mozambican natural gas for domestic use (continuation of the pilot project for natural gas-powered buses, expansion of electrification, and doubling of electricity capacity) and rethinking urban planning in line with available energy sources.
- Promote Mozambique to European and Asian buyers as a reliable supplier of LNG, coordinating security in Cabo Delgado, the production timetable and project financing.
- Define and communicate a foreign policy doctrine for geopolitical crises: pragmatic non-alignment, defence of multilateralism, and active economic diplomacy with the US, China, Russia, India, the European Union and the Gulf states.
- Empower the private sector to manage geopolitical risk — through insurance, currency hedging and updated force majeure clauses in contracts — and strengthen hedging instruments for strategic importers.
Methodological note
Fórum Externo prepared this document. It includes summaries of the speakers’ presentations — Riyadh Sidat (Fórum Externo), Fatima Papelo, lecturer at Joaquim Chissano University, and Irchard Mahomed.
FÓRUM EXTERNO
www.forumexterno.org
geral@forumexterno.org